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The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy
Crisis: What Does the Beast Look Like?
Manfred ELSIG1
The concept of legitimacy has many facets. The article reviews from a politics and
law perspective the diagnosis of an ``institution in crisis''. This article is divided into
three sections. It starts with a cautionary note on existing fallacies about assessing
multilateral intergovernmental institutions and discusses competing schools of thought
that approach the World Trade Organization (WTO) with varying perceptions of
democracy and legitimacy. Section II takes up the actual debate on redesigning the
WTO and directs attention to the question of balancing input and output legitimacy.
Section III sketches potential avenues of research that have been neglected in the past.
I. INTRODUCTION
When trade ministers meet during the biannual ministerial meetings, protesters
gather just around the block. Since the infamous Seattle meeting in 1999, the WTO has
been faced with an unprecedented and accelerating surge in civil society interest in its
workings. The WTO has ascended to become a prime target of anti-globalization
movements. With the exception of the Doha meeting in 2001, often-violent street
protests have become a trademark of WTO gatherings. Among the most vocal and eye-
catching protesters during the sixth WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong in December
2005 were angry farmers from South Korea who clashed with police forces on the
streets and jumped into the not so inviting water of Victoria Harbour in an attempt to
swim to the conference centre.
At the first WTO ministerial gathering in Singapore in 1996 following the
conclusion and adoption of the Uruguay Round (UR), many trade diplomats savoured
the successful closure of a long and laborious trade round. A large number of trade
ministers took pride in what they had achieved; many legal trade experts applauded the
artfully drafted dispute settlement system as the ``jewel in the crown'', international
relations scholars from the neoliberal institutionalist camp celebrated the institutional
turn in global politics and neorealists searched for explanations to fit this
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intergovernmental organization (IGO) into the anarchic world of power politics.
Singapore came to be known as the first and (so far) last WTO Ministerial meeting at
which national trade ministers enjoyed the club-like ambience that had come to
characterize its forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) over
many years (Keohane and Nye, 2001). The points on the agenda were not particularly
controversial, public criticism was largely absent and media attention was still
moderate.2 Few participants of ``executive multilateralism'' (ZuÈrn, 2004) anticipated
at this stage the emerging challenges to a declining model-type polity for State-driven
governance beyond the nation-State.
From Seattle, Doha, and Cancun to Hong Kong, most criticism has been directed
at the WTO when it moved to take up a number of ``new trade issues'', thus intruding
into those policy domains that formerly fell under quasi-exclusive national regulatory
sovereignty.3 In addition, work on ``old issues'' such as agriculture, textiles and trade
remedies has remained highly controversial. The UR agreement has increasingly led to
the melting of nationally constructed buffer zones that coped with gradual trade
liberalization. Whereas many developed nations have simply altered their tools to
accommodate to change (i.e., the structure of side payments, the nature of safeguards,
direct versus indirect protection), most developing countries lack sufficient means of
controlling the impact of these changes (with the exception of the use of high tariffs and
the increasing use of remedies, i.e., anti-dumping legislation). Additional concerns have
been raised that trading partners are directly challenging domestic institutions and
policies and that basic GATT-inherited principles (i.e., non-discrimination, national
treatment) pay little attention to a number of non-trade concerns.4
Moreover, studies on the ``unbalanced'' outcome of the UR have contributed to a
growing perception of a zero-sum game in global trade regulation (Finger and NogueÂs,
2002; Ostry, 2002). Growing dissatisfaction with the output has provoked a second
glance at how decisions have been made among technocrats that have enjoyed limited
attention from the public (and their elected representatives) in the past. In other words,
the failure to adequately satisfy the growing number of stakeholders has led to increased
focus on processes. Generally, overall satisfaction has decreased and the ``voice'' of
interested stakeholders in the workings of the global organization has evidently
intensified.5
What underlies most of the criticism directed at the WTO, is an explicit (or at least
implicit) argument that there is a democratic deficit. An often observed pattern of
2 The Ministerial meeting in Singapore spearheaded the inclusion of (additional) trade-related topics on the
multilateral trading agenda: the so-called Singapore issues (competition, investment, government procurement,
trade facilitation). Due to widespread criticism from developing countries and civil society activists only ``trade
facilitation'' finally made it into the scope of the Doha trade talks.
3 The new trade issues include the field of services, intellectual property, investments, human rights, and the
environment. Perceived and factual intrusiveness differs greatly from agreement to agreement.
4 Others have argued that the principle of non-discrimination runs the risk of becoming hollowed out as
exceptions to non-discrimination have multiplied (e.g., Srinivasan, 2005).
5 The most extreme voices call for an end to the institution.
76 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
criticism is to draw on anecdotal evidence to make a case for concerns of legitimate
governance, for example, on access for and accountability to stakeholders, the mode of
decision-making in ministerial meetings, the effects on domestic institutions and thus
pressure on democratically defined norms to change. Several scholars from various
fields of political science, international relations (IR) and international economic law
have joined the call for more democracy (e.g., Esty, 2002).6 Who would not agree with
such a call? These proponents of a growth industry that advocates more democracy
beyond the nation-State also contribute to a perception of an insufficient degree of
legitimacy, a necessary condition for the stability of a democratic polity. Yet, the jury is
still out.
A number of jury members in the field of traditional IR theories have only
recently turned to questions of legitimacy triggered by limited progress being made in
the WTO to tackle global externalities.7 Cooperation under anarchy in the GATT era
seemed easier to achieve than in the more norm-guided environment of today.
Cooperation obstacles to the reciprocal lowering of tariffs in goods (negative
integration) were far less obstructive than today's distributional challenges in the
effort to harmonize rules (positive integration). The GATT regime was mainly seen as
an extension of the Westphalian system providing necessary public goods through an
efficient trading regime controlled at the outset by a hegemonic power, and later
backed by a number of strong sponsors of the regime (Gilpin, 1987).8 International
relations scholars tried to come to grips with the growing influence of the GATT and
its successor, the WTO. From a realist perspective, institutions are created to
represent the power of certain sponsors (Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994).
Participants sign the agreements they are willing to comply with and they install
control mechanisms to monitor the organization closely. Powerful actors can leave
the organization, at any time, if it does not produce satisfactory results. They have the
option of turning to other settings (forum-shopping phenomenon). In contrast, from
a functionalist-liberal perspective, institutions overcome a classical prisoner's dilemma
situation. Repeated games help to tackle cooperation limits by lowering transaction
costs, increasing information and creating additional incentives to tackle the
enforcement problem (Keohane, 1984). The regime theory literature took up these
questions and analysed the creation and development of international regimes (and
international organizations) focusing on how cooperation was sustainable over time
(Hasenclever et al., 1997).
6 For an opposing view, see Henderson (2002).
7 See Robert Keohane's interest in questions of accountability (Keohane, 2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005).
8 From an international relations perspective, the GATT regime is compatible with the Westphalian
conception as intrusiveness into national politics through elimination of tariff barriers was marginal. From an
international law reading based on Wolfgang Friedmann's taxonomy, the GATT is often depicted as distinct from
the Westphalian system. The latter is characterized as a system of coexistence, whereas the GATT regime is defined
as a system of coordination (for a critical view on this differentiation, see Abi-Saab (1998)).
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International relations scholars and regime theorists did not pay particular attention
to democratic issues, as cooperation in an anarchic world could not be democratically
organized anyhow (Dahl, 1999).9 In the past, the majority of IR scholars highlighted
the differences between international and national politics and therefore created a
discipline inward-orientation. In the 1980s, theoretical work in IR, in particular
manifest in the neo±neo debate (neorealism versus neoliberalism), still centred on the
questions of power and structure. The end of the cold war and the unfolding
legalization of international politics, however, have caught many IR scholars by
surprise.10 Thinking about governance beyond the nation-State and tracing different
spheres of authorities along the domestic±international frontier (Rosenau, 1997) gave
birth to the ``global governance'' literature. The distinction between national and
international has become blurred as methodological tools to analyse multi-level
governance have fused (Milner, 1998).11 Moreover, the globalization debate that started
during the 1990s reflected a growing discontent among stakeholders about how global
public policy was conducted and which led to a new wave of literature focusing on how
to understand and eventually institutionally react to globalization processes (Held and
McGrew, 2003).12 In terms of the global economy, calls have intensified to find a new
consensus to replace or re-invent ``embedded liberalism'' as a leading paradigm for
legitimate global governance.13
I argue in this article that the concept of legitimacy has many facets and the
diagnosis of an ``institution in crisis'' needs a more rigorous assessment in light of
dominant philosophical conceptions on the optimal design and functioning of an
international organization. This article is divided into three sections. I start with a
cautionary note on existing fallacies about assessing multilateral intergovernmental
cooperation in light of democratic notions. Informed by these general biases, I present
and discuss competing schools of thought that approach the WTO with varying
perceptions of democracy and legitimacy. The second section of the article hints at the
actual debate on redesigning the WTO and directs attention to the question of
balancing input and output legitimacy. The third section sketches potential avenues of
research that have been neglected in the past.
9 Many WTO contracting parties still fail to meet a number of democratic standards developed in liberal
democracies.
10 On the concept of ``legalization'', see Goldstein et al. (2000); and Finnemore and Toope (2001).
11 In international trade law, we have witnessed a convergence of constitutional and public international law
(Cottier and Hertig, 2003).
12 For a critical account on the global governance literature, see Whitman (2005).
13 The embedded liberalism concept (Ruggie, 1983) characterized the trade regime until the end of the
Uruguay Round. The dominant role of neoliberal ideas (as illustrated by the Washington (+Geneva) Consensus) in
the 1990s, has contributed to the redefinition of the embedded liberalism paradigm (see Stiglitz (2002); on the
notion's original meaning, see Williamson (2000), and see also NaõÂm (2000)). The neoliberal paradigm has been
more dominant in the Washington-based intergovernmental financial institutions than in the Geneva-based WTO.
The latter still exhibits several mercantilist elements, as market access is used as an important ``currency'' in the
negotiations and reciprocity serves as a guiding principle.
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II. HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THIS POLITY?
A. SOME CAUTIONARY REMARKS
Applying democratic concepts to multilateral economic institutions is a tricky task,
as a number of fallacies need to be avoided. First, the yardstick of comparison is often
too ambitious. The IGOs should not be assessed according to democratic principles
developed and shaped in the realm of nationally defined arenas of deliberations (whose
implementation records are often far from convincing). This point is advocated by
Moravcsik who states that ``rather than comparing international organizations to
idealized ancient, Westminster-style, or imaginary political systems, the baseline should
be the real-world practices of existing governments acting imperfectly under complex
constraints'' (2004: 362). One needs to distinguish the disordered polities of
international cooperation from domestic governance structures, where demos is
clearly discernible, deliberation is more structured and mostly parliament-driven and
where raison d'eÂtat has been shaped, defined and brushed up over many decades of the
respective polis' existence. Moreover, echoing this cautious note, Kahler argues that one
aspect often overlooked is how contemporary democracies have strengthened the role
of technocratic bodies and delegated rule-making to ``non-majoritarian institutions
(NMIs), such as the judiciary (whose accountability to electorates and governments
varies widely) and central banks . . .'' (2004: 133).14 Second, many interested citizens
(including scholars) in the developed nations have a tendency to overrate the political
systems they have been socialized in.15 Therefore it is important to specify one's own
perception and values held (Werthaltung) of democratic principles and be responsive to
arguments derived from overlapping or even competing schools of democratic thought.
Third, there is a tendency to opt for a partial view. The WTO lends itself perfectly to
being named and shamed for not meeting certain (not clearly defined) democratic
standards. However, a more holistic view when assessing processes and outcomes of
emerging polities is needed.
The WTO, for instance, is a Member-driven organization that needs to meet a
multitude of expectations and concerns of legitimate governance (see Grant and
Keohane, 2005). Trying to fix one aspect of the polity will not automatically lead to
more democracy. Redesign might unintentionally produce democratically equivocal
repercussions for other procedural or structural elements (see also Pauwelyn, 2005),
14 Esty advocates an opposing view. ``Until recently, the trade regime benefited from a sense that
international economics and trade policy making were highly technical realms best left in the hands of an elite cadre
of qualified experts'' (Esty, 2002: 10). The moment the wider public perceived that trade experts were no longer
working just on technical or scientific matters, the politicization set in. Therefore, the comparison to domestic
practice of delegating in highly technical areas, such as competition or monetary policy decisions, might not be
persuasive.
15 I would argue that interviewing randomly selected British or Swiss citizens on the optimal form of political
organization, the Westminster model or the Consociational Democracy model accordingly would reveal high
acceptance levels in relation to other forms of democratic organization.
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e.g., increased transparency in deliberation processes within an international
organization couldÐunder a particular set of conditionsÐhamper output efficiency.
Fourth, one should not overestimate the importance of the institution in the current
debate on democratic governance in transnational relations; we should not fall into the
n-1 (single case-study) trap that has characterized EU integration theories for far too
long (Caporaso, 1997; Moravcsik, 1997; Risse, 1997). Whereas, the WTO's dispute
settlement system portrays peculiar characteristics in the international realm (e.g., high
degree of legalization) (Goldstein and Martin, 2000), deliberation, bargaining and
coalition building in rule creation should not be de-emphasized and lend themselves to
being analysed from a comparative perspective (see also Moravcsik, 2004: 343). Finally,
one should not cling to a type of model that had its heyday in the past, when the GATT
was still predominantly characterized as a club (see Keohane and Nye, 2001). It does
not help to lament that the general equilibrium the GATT model successfully produced
for many years in the second half of the twentieth century is no longer attainable
(Barfield, 2001; Sally, 2003).16
In the following, I discuss several philosophical perceptions drawing from theories
on democracy, IR and international law in order to illustrate the diverging conceptions
held by practitioners and scholars when they describe or proscribe the ``nature of the
beast''. The origins of philosophical views need to be clearly traced to avert a debate
characterized by the ``ships-that-pass-in-the-night'' phenomenon.
B. PERCEPTIONS
If one attributes a territorially bound conception or the existence of corresponding
demos to democratic societies, then by definition many governance structures in the
international and regional realm fail the test (Dahl, 1999; Weiler, 1999). In short, such a
conception rules out the existence of democratic IGOs. In this article, I do not abandon
democratic concepts as they shape the observer's perception; however, I attempt to
direct the debate to analysing international organizations through the prism of concepts
related to ``legitimate governance''.17
Moravcsik lists four dominant sources or conceptions from which criticism has
been directed towards IGOs. These perspectives comprise a deliberate conception of
democracy to improve political capacity of the citizenry, a pluralist conception
concentrating on accountability, a libertarian conception as a means to protect
individual liberties and a social-democratic conception to offset the power of
concentrated wealth (2004: 338). In international law, various concepts of a
legitimate WTO can be traced in the so-called ``constitutionalization debate''. A
significant number of contributions in this discipline follow the tradition of positive
16 This is not to be confounded with lessons to be learned from the past.
17 This article shares a concept of legitimacy as defined by Nanz and Steffek: ``Legitimacy can be understood
as a general compliance of the people with decisions of a political order that goes beyond coercion or the
contingent representation of interests'' (2004: 315).
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legal theory, where legitimacy is derived from the process defined by the legal order and
which is characterized by a higher order norm to validate the system (Kelsen, 1945;
Hart, 1961; Cass, 2005: 32). In such a reading the notions of legality and legitimacy are
often used interchangeably.18 In Deborah Cass's systematic description of the debate,
she pinpoints several elements that exhibit a normative predisposition for a ``positive
state-based theory'' (Cass, 2005: 19). These elements include the limitation of
economic or political behaviour, the belief in the emergence of a Grundnorm that leads
to a coherent set of rules, the existence of an active political community, a deliberative
law-making capacity which triggers greater process-induced social acceptance and an
additional dose of legitimacy (Cass, 2005: 19).19 In Franck's contributions, elements of
process and outcome are linked. Legitimacy is dependent on the process underpinned
by a contractarian understanding and a belief in procedural fairness (Franck, 1988,
1995). He does not stop there and adds additional factors that lead to more compliance
(compliance-pull), such as textual determinacy (unambiguous messages), symbolic
validation to increase authority, coherence of the rules, and adherence of States (Franck,
1995: 25±46). In terms of output, he focuses on equity as a proxy for fairness, which
overlaps with philosophical conceptions developed in political science.
In the following, I use the concepts described above, separate these into structure/
processes (input) and outcome (output) and supplement them with additional
conceptions, which have received less attention in the academic debate on WTO
reform. Building upon Fritz Scharpf's work on the European Union, the dual
perception of input and output legitimacy lends itself to discuss IGO policy processes,
design and outcome.20 In addition, it is important to note that normative views and
empirical experience influence the choice of issues to be singled out (and rated) for
democratic scrutiny. Most of the forms are ideal positions, which in discourse are
presented in combination with other types of perceptions leading to mixed forms.
1. Input Legitimacy
Input conceptions can be broadly distinguished according to whether they focus
primarily on processes or structure of the polity. The most prominent ideal-type
democratic perspectives focusing on the process are the deliberative and pluralist
models.
The deliberative model directs attention to access to the system, an open and
information-rich decision-making environment and debate in a non-hierarchical
18 On various existing views of consitutionalization, see Cass (2005: 17); see also Cottier and Hertig (2003).
For earlier work on consitutionalization, see Jackson (1998), and Petersmann (1997).
19 She distinguishes three dominant visions of WTO constitutionalization: institutional managerialism, right-
based constitutionalization and judicial norm-generation (Cass, 2005). Most of the work under these labels
understands constitutionalization more from a finaliteÂ perspective than a procedural perspective (see also Peters,
2006).
20 See Scharpf (1999) on input and output legitimacy; Weiler (2000) separates structural (process) from
material (outcome) issues.
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milieu (Verweij and Josling, 2003). Special emphasis is placed on increasing the
legitimacy of the system by increasing means of deliberation. One way of doing this is
by creating ``appropriate public spheres'' that do not serve to aggregate self-interests,
``but rather to foster mutual learning, and to eventually transform preferences while
converging on a policy choice oriented toward the public interest'' (Nanz and Steffek,
2004: 319). These ideas are largely influenced by Habermasian conceptions of
procedural environments towards improving ``authority free discourse'' and non-
hierarchical steering (see also Risse, 2004). ``Deliberate democrats'' are very sceptical of
representative elements (i.e., delegation to technocratic institutions) and push for
increased participation through improved inclusion of stakeholders and greater
transparency in rule making (e.g., Krajewski, 2001). Public deliberation is depicted
as a key variable as ``the authoritative decisions imposed by governments demand
justification to those burdened by authority, and justification must appeal to evidence
and argument acceptable to reasonable citizens'' (King, 2003: 26). Legitimacy can be
improved by ``a process of careful and informed reflection on facts and opinions,
generally leading to a judgment on the matter at hand'' (ibid.: 25). Deliberative models
strongly emphasize the primacy of processes of public reasoning and the inclusion of
diverse ideas. They neglect concerns over the goods of public interest to be produced.
Translated in the context of the WTO, a deliberate perspective might advocate the
creation of a WTO assembly or parliament in order to decrease the distance between
the rulers and the ruled.21 In addition, proposals are put forward to improve the
participation and expertise of the least developed and other low-income countries
(internal transparency). Yet, equally important are ideas to strengthen the interface
between political institutions and civil society by ameliorating the amount and quality
of information and access to the system for non-governmental groups (external
transparency).22
Pluralist conceptions emphasize competition among interest groups and direct
accountability of the people's representatives. Pluralism has been very influential as a
theory of policy aggregation and governance in the United States (Lindblom, 1977;
Dahl, 1999). Democracies are perceived as systems of bargaining among various interest
groups in which the governmental actors are intermediaries or referees at best. The
system is characterized by active citizens and assumed equality in opportunities in voice
(Moravcsik, 2004). Decision-making is depicted as ``a complex process of conflict,
negotiation, and compromise'' (King, 2003: 32). An important feature is electoral
accountability by which representatives of various interests can be sanctioned or
replaced. Translated to the WTO, a pluralist conception supports institutional settings
that allow for the representation of diverse interests and sanctioning of runaway
representatives or bureaucrats. The rule-making process is pictured as ``political in a
21 On improving parliamentary involvement in the WTO from a practitioner's perspective, see Mann (2003).
22 See Shaffer's (2003) excellent contribution on increasing parliamentary oversight with a particular
emphasis on developing countries.
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manner that makes it appropriate to the determination, or at least scrutiny, of policy
choices that involve contested values and warring constituencies'' (Howse, 2003: 85,
emphasis in original). In opposition to deliberate conceptions, pluralists, however, are
reluctant to offset power imbalances and are primarily competition-oriented.
Structural concepts look at the optimal design of representation and the
relationship between political authorities located on different levels or layers of
governance. Political systems in democracies differ in the degree of representation,
delegation and control. Some systems, such as the classical Westminster model, rely on
delegated powers to people's representatives and periodic electoral accountability,
whereas a model of direct democracy highlights direct participatory rights and ``voice''
by affected citizens (Lijphart, 1999; Grant and Keohane, 2005). The former concept
values the important role of politicians (members of parliaments and governments)
through a governance for the people perspective, whereas the latter concentrates more
on constant voters' oversight (governance by the people) and critically assesses negative
side-effects of delegation to experts or non-elected officials. For the latter group
``democracy is an ideal of self-government, of a group of actors ruling themselves as
members of a political community'' (King, 2003: 25). Delegation costs are strongly
stressed by proponents of direct democracy (but also deliberative models) when applied
to the international level, as the chain of delegation often increases whereas direct
control through national parliaments or citizen decreases (see also Howse, 2003).23
Grant and Keohane (2005) attempt to bridge these two concepts by providing new
visions of accountability flowing from a participation and delegation model and
presenting a number of mechanisms that would hold state and non-state authorities
increasingly accountable in the global arena.
An overlapping structural debate unfolds between ``centralists'' (to which many
constitutionalists would subscribe) and what I call ``subsidiarists'' (see Howse and
NicolaõÈdis, 2003).24 What underlies these concepts is a different assessment of the
problem-solving capacities and thus of where decisions should be carried out (and
eventually enforced). The centralist school follows a functionalist logic in problem-
solving. They argue that lower levels of authority fail to take into account general
interests for providing optimal public goods.25 In the context of WTO reform,
centralists do not aspire to create a world government, but rather pledge for an increase
in sovereignty transfer from the subnational and national levels to the international
level. The subsidiarist school reckons that policy innovation is most likely in a
competitive environment among equal national and subnational entities. They argue
that legitimacy will increase through empowering lower levels of governance (a
23 Howse (2002) goes so far as to advocate the right of ratification by the people through means of
referendum.
24 The debate between centralists and subsidiarists focuses on concerns of exclusive or shared sovereignty. It
could also be termed the ``federalist'' debate (e.g., federalist±antifederalist or federalist±confederalist).
25 In the literature on WTO constitutionalization, Cass's notion of ``institutional managerialism'' overlaps
with the centralist school's optimism about the institutions' key role in increasing legitimacy (Cass, 2005; see also
Jackson, 1998).
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bottom-up approach). Decisions should be coordinated and taken at the level most
likely to exhibit the greatest problem-solving capacities. The international level should
focus more on providing information, monitoring and supportingÐthrough peer
pressure processÐspill-overs across polities.
2. Output Legitimacy
Concepts of legitimate governance further address the output side. Political
systems are usually judged by their overall performance. Key questions include: What is
the public good to be provided and how does the system score in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency? What are the costs of action or inaction (ConceicËaÄo, 2003)? Applying
Moravscik's taxonomy, the liberal model and the social-democratic model are output-
oriented perceptions. The libertarian view stands for the protection of specific rights of
its members and is often characterized by a critical view of governmental actors trying
to limit liberal values. The citizen has to be protected from an active Leviathan that
attempts to impose its will on the people (a critical position that also partly draws from
Weber's writings).26 Translated to the WTO, this includes the right to trade, the right
to market access, the protection of civil liberties, and the protection of properties
(Barfield, 2001). The liberal school primarily defends the WTO as an institution that
protects the right to trade (McGillivray, 2000) or an institution where decision-makers
attempt to lock in liberal reforms and counter rent-seeking pressures (Messerlin, 2004).
For some liberals, the State has to be protected from a WTO run-amok that tries to
regulate trade-related policy issues. According to Cass's categorization, ``right-based
constitutionalization'' yields elements from a liberal model in relation to specific rights
(e.g. property rights, right to trade), but also draws from concepts that strengthen
legalization by granting WTO law direct effect, increasing judicial review and
constraining certain types of power. A strong proponent of this school has been
Petersmann (1991). His early work concentrated on questions of keeping
protectionism in check, moving from State to individual rights and direct
invocability of WTO law. Subsequently, Petersmann (2000) has linked trade to non-
trade concerns as part of a wider human rights approach, thus distinguishing his
approach from traditional liberal ones.
The social-democratic model of legitimate governance is also largely principle-
oriented. For proponents of this school, the purpose of the system is to offset power
asymmetries and correct imbalances. In addition, minorities need to be protected. A
strong element is the solidarity among actors in the system (Held, 2004b). Held's vision
of a cosmopolitan democracy strongly reflects such principles. In the WTO reform
26 In line with Max Weber there is a common uneasiness about bureaucratic organizations pursuing their
own instead of the general interests, see Verweij and Josling (2003: 2). Whereas this argument has been mainly
directed at the Washington-based IMF and World Bank, the criticism directed at the WTO is less focused on
bureaucrats of the secretariat, than on the limited transparency and power-led procedures controlled by nationally
delegated bureaucrats.
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debate, social-democratic concepts refer to the need for helping losers of liberalization
processes in the tradition of the ``embedded liberalism'' consensus (e.g., providing policy
space). In terms of output they call for instruments to level the playing field and protect
consumer rights as the principles are biased towards the interests of producers. Overall,
they perceive the liberalization agenda of the WTO as a direct threat to social democracy
and the European type of welfare state. Elements of the social-democratic model have
manifested in the increasing calls for making the WTO more development-friendly.
Similarly, Cass strongly arguesÐimplicitly applying an anti-contitutionalization
approachÐfor prioritizing output legitimacy (what she calls trade democracy) to
increase standards of living in the developing world and to include health, environment,
and safety concerns within the domain of economic policy (Cass, 2005: 26±27). She
refers to a potential drawback related to the consitutionalization debate in the trade law
community. ``By worrying incessantly about whether and when the WTO will be
constitutionalized we have turned our attention from what sort of trading system we might
want'' (ibid.: 27, emphasis in original). A particular institutional feature of the WTO,
which has attracted ample interest in the debate on output legitimacy, is the strong role
attributed to the judicial branch of the WTO: the dispute settlement body (DSB). In the
past few years, judicial decision-making has become much politicized. Liberal and
social-democratic views largely differ in their assessment of how the DSB has interpreted
the guiding rules and norms and how it has balanced the guiding principles.
In addition, there has been increasing consensus among scholars coming from
different IR traditions that the issue of inadequate external accountability is a major
obstacle to legitimacy. Keohane acknowledges that the key normative issue of
legitimate governance can be defined as failing external accountability, ``accountability
to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it'' (2003: 141).27
Following from this work, Grant and Keohane (2005) attempt to cross the input±
output divide by using the concept of accountability as a benchmark for legitimate
governance. They draw attention to the tools at disposal to constrain the abuse of
power by applying a Weberian notion of limiting authorities' power. ``The problem of
abuse of power is particularly serious in world politics, because even the minimal types
of constraints found in domestic governments are absent on the global level'' (2005:
30). The (mis)use of power, however, has often been exercised by States and not the
global economic multilaterals themselves, which leads Grant and Keohane to conclude
with a view to unilateralism: ``Ironically for those who attack the WTO as
unaccountable, it represents one of the few attempts in world politics to formalize
legal and supervisory accountability over the actions of sovereign states'' (2005: 39).28
27 Risse (2004) attempts to blend Scharpf's concepts of legitimacy with Keohane's notion of internal and
external accountability; Held (2004a) provides an analysis based on achieving equivalence between those deciding
and those affected by a certain policy.
28 Following from the argument of unilateral abuse of power Grant and Keohane observe that in such a
context ``domestic democracy is insufficient. Even democratic states will act in a biased way towards noncitizens''
(2005: 40).
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Similarly, Smythe advocates assessing the WTO's legitimacy from a State-level
perspective as legitimacy ``is also derived from its sovereign member states which make
the decisions'' (2005: 4).29
III. THE REDESIGN OF THE WTO AS A BALANCING ACT
In a recent report by an appointed group of eminent persons (the so-called
Sutherland Report) a number of reform proposals have been put forward (Sutherland et
al., 2004). The clear message from the report is that no quick fix is in sight, not to speak
of a ``constitutional moment''. This report's diagnosis and the proposed reforms have
been discussed in great depth in the law community, less so in the economics and IR
communities.30 Most commentators critically review specific proposals against a
benchmark rooted deeply in their philosophical conceptions, but few take up the
challenge to approach reform from a dynamic perspective in which input and output
are linked and philosophical boundaries transcended.31 PauwelynÐinterpreting his
mandate more broadly than his peersÐadvocates a framework for reform that takes into
account ``the fluid equilibrium between law and politics, discipline and participation
and the bi-directional relationship that brings it about'' (2005: 338). In addition, the
report has been rightly criticized for its narrowness in concentrating on the WTO and
failing to provide for a more holistic view of international politics and overlap with
other policy objectives and regimes or as Finger puts it, the reports puts forward
``detailed instructions on how to set the sails of the good ship WTO, but no knowledge
of wind, tide or the sea on which she sails'' (Finger, 2005: 803, emphasis in original).
From a pragmatic perspective, one could advocate addressing the most pressing
legitimacy issues the WTO/GATT regime is confronted with. Grant and Keohane's
contribution can be read in such a light as they concentrate on accountability
mechanisms that cut across input and output. When assessing the gradual attempts of
the WTO to open up to the public in a move to increase external transparency, the
WTO record seems not as bad as most critics claim.32 The WTO as an institution has
increasingly engaged with civil society groups, has opened up the Ministerial
negotiations to a large number of non-governmental organizations and has provided
far more access to documents that used to be restricted in the past (for an overview, see
Smythe, 2005). Member countries, by contrast, have been more reluctant to open up to
the public. Notwithstanding an increasing number of countries switching to a more
29 James Bacchus, a former member of the Appellate Body, argues that legitimacy is derived from, ``and is
inseparable from, the individual legitimacy of each of the individual `nation-states' that, together, comprise `the
WTO''' (Bacchus, 2004: 669, emphasis in original).
30 See 8 Journal of International Economic Law 2 and 3 (2005); Finger (2005). There was little coverage in
the media (e.g., The Economist, 22 January 2005).
31 Petersmann (2005) for his part proposes a number of institutional changes on the input and output side,
but does not address trade-off issues.
32 Applying the benchmark set by the democratic perspectives discussed above, most of these would be rather
silent on this issue. Exceptions are found in the deliberative school, which advocates further non-hierarchical
debate and the liberal school which cautions against too active participation of the non-elected civil society groups.
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open system of consultation in the policy formulation process (see Hocking, 2004), the
limited right to exercise ``voice'' in the domestic policy setting in many contracting
parties, creates a tangible expectations±capacities gap undermining the organization's
legitimacy. As illustrated above, international organizations are very much member-
driven. Norm change occurs primarily through member-induced decisions. As a
consequence, accountability deficits are more often a phenomenon of the ``result of
choices by the most influential national governments than a symptom of the
dysfunctions of international bureaucracies'' (Kahler, 2004: 141).33 A new standard
to increase transparency was set by the parties involved in the Hormone case. They
decided to have hearings openly diffused to the interested public.34 This is the first time
that debates in the judicial branch have been ``declassified'' in real time to the public.
This decision represents a symbolic quantum leap from the times when the Member
States still tried to block outside interference in judicial rule-interpretation (i.e.,
information from non-governmental organizations). The infamous amicus curiae brief
debate (see Mavroidis, 2001) is a good illustration for understanding the reluctance of
many Members to interact with civil society.35 More reform potential has been located
in the area of internal transparency (and accountability), as the least developed and other
low-income countries still cannot act as equal partners in the system for a number of
reasons (see Smythe, 2005; Elsig, 2006; Smythe and Smith, 2006). This creates
important legitimacy concerns for the institution from the angle of most of the
democratic perspectives outlined above.
Notwithstanding progress or stagnation in reforming the input side, there seems to
be an increasing consensus that the litmus test for legitimacy is directly linked to the
effectiveness of the system (output legitimacy). One major call is to help developing
countries to reap more benefits from the system by making the organization more
development-oriented. In the context of the current (at the time of writing suspended)
WTO negotiations (the so-called Doha Development Agenda), there is growing
consensus among representatives of developing countries that effective outcomes
should be more in the limelight of reform debate; or as Smythe put it: ``if the
development aspect of the current round turns out to be nothing more than a cynical
re-branding exercise it will only further erode legitimacy of the WTO in the eyes of
many of its Members and the broader international community'' (2005: 23). In the end,
demos demands welfare-enhancing policy decisions and disregards issues on input
processes that do not fully live up to some democratically defined ideal case.
33 The WTO is Member-driven to a greater extent than its Washington-based Bretton-Woods sisters (IMF/
World Bank).
34 Moves to increase transparency have been openly supported by former members of the Appellate Body
(e.g., Lacarte, 2004). James Bacchus in a speech given during a WTO Public Symposium (Geneva, April 2004)
reiterated the call for more openness and transparency.
35 The contentious issue of accepting written contributions from non-governmental organizations
overlapped with the Members' wish to control an active and gap-filling judiciary.
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What follows from the above discussion of legitimate governance through
international governmental organizations is that we need to apply a dynamic view of
input and output legitimacy to overcome a rigid dichotomy. A categorization that
focuses either on processes/structures or output runs the risks of segmenting the
problem, cutting it into small salami slices and losing the broader picture. Input and
output are clearly linked (Scharpf, 1999). Scharpf's work on European integration has
alluded to potential trade-offs between input and output legitimacy that makes the
relation more contentious than is often assumed. As briefly noted in the first part of this
article, an increase in input legitimacy could come at the cost of outcome effectiveness.
The message here is that increasing democracy in the process carries the danger of
undermining the system's overall performance. In other words, openness could turn
out to be a double-edged sword. ``Under the Club Model, governments operating
behind closed doors can cut deals to lower tariff barriers and to open markets for the
benefit of the general public out of sight of rent seekers, protectionists, and other special
interests'' (Esty, 2002: 11).
As Stasavage (2004) demonstrates in his contribution, the call for increased
transparency could potentially have a negative effect on the bargaining outcome.
``Bargaining that takes place in public helps ensure that representatives propose policies
preferred by their constituents. But open-door bargaining also encourages
representatives to posture by adopting overly aggressive bargaining positions that
increase risks of breakdown in negotiations'' (2004: 695). Goldstein and Martin (2000)
argue along similar lines. The process of increased legalization leads to improved
information on the pay-offs of ongoing negotiations, thus strengthening protectionist
forces vis-aÁ-vis free trade interests which in turn decreases the likelihood of further
liberalization. Further arguments can be found in the literature that caution against the
increase of voice by channelling more politics into the system. Increased participation of
politicians in highly technical negotiations could not only slow down the negotiation
process but eventually lead to inefficient outcomes due to lack of knowledge on the
substance (and the rules and tactics of negotiations) or as Aberbach et al. phrase it,
``policymaking by bureaucrats and policymaking by politicians exhibit different
weaknesses. . . . The moral dilemma posed by bureaucratic policymaking is power
without responsibility; the dilemma of policymaking by politicians is power without
competence . . .'' (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981: 4).36 Finally, stagnant
processes could lead to ``missing'' output adversely affecting Members' satisfaction with
the system, leaving the strong parties with the option of signalling their discontent and
eventually exiting (see Hirschmann, 1970).37
Other scholars exhibit a less pessimistic view of the relations between input and
output and call for more politics and more law (Pauwelyn, 2005). Steinberg (2004) goes
36 This argument needs to be further qualified in the sense that those politicians that quickly build expertise
on the issues and participate in the negotiations for some time can increase their standing and influence in the
negotiations by offering leadership.
37 One way of partial exit is seen in turning towards bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements.
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a step further by alluding to the system's inherent self-correcting capacities to limit
imbalance. This can be illustrated by the shift of de facto rule-making capacities that
characterize the post UR period. The UR led to an increase in judicialization but has
left legislative rule-making modes largely unchanged.38 The unfolding tensions due to
the privileged role of the dispute settlement system have brought the proclaimed
institutional ``jewel in the crown'' under intense public scrutiny. The fear that
governments would turn to the WTO to adjudicate unresolved issues was widespread
(see Hudec, 2002; Barfield, 2001). In the first six years after the creation of the WTO
the number of cases brought before the WTO's judiciary surged. As a consequence,
there has been an increasing gap opening up between rule-making and rule
interpretation. Yet, since 2002 the number of trade disputes brought to Geneva has
decreased. The main trade actors have become more reluctant to put controversial
issues to the WTO tribunal, and the panels and Appellate Body (AB) have shown a
high degree of judicial self-restraint (Ehlermann, 2002). The AB's activism has been
limited by legal discourse, more politics and constitutional rules that provide for checks
and balances (Steinberg, 2004). Steinberg argues that this has automatically led to a new
equilibrium in which the gap between legislative and judicial law-making is
controlled.39
Focusing on the system's outcomes to assess output legitimacy is important;
however, there is a strong argument to be made that input side should not be neglected
as the belief in fair processes potentially increases the rate of compliance with negotiated
treaties, thus increasing output legitimacy (Franck, 1988).40 What follows from the
above is that there is an implicit balance to be achieved between input and output,
which is important for the stability of the system in the long term.
IV. THE MISSING PIECES
Future research on the balance and dynamics of input and output legitimacy in the
WTO needs to focus on comparative social scientific analysis. We need to draw from
real-world experience in national policy arenas. ``In order to assess the extent to which
a given insulation or delegation of power in an international organization is
democratically legitimate, we may ask whether a similar institutional adaptation is
widely accepted in existing democratic systems'' (Moravcsik, 2004: 347). Besides the
national benchmark, we need to draw from insights developed in other global
economic multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, IMF or regional
38 Notwithstanding proposals to change to weighted voting, the system's consensus rule was even
strengthened; see Ehlermann and Ehring (2005).
39 Others put it less optimistically by acknowledging that, ``the imbalance between the WTO judiciary and
its political branch is here to stay'' (Pauwelyn, 2005: 345).
40 See also ZuÈrn (2004: 261), who draws on Seymour Lipset's work on how the empirical belief in the
legitimacy of an institution is linked to normative validity of a political order.
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(economic) organizations, such as the European Community. In particular, a rich
literature on legitimate governance in EU politics already exists.
Of the static analyses that focus on either input or output, there are relatively few
on the output side.41 Research has been dominated by contributions concentrating
largely on the input side, focusing on domestic factors influencing trade policy-making,
various aspects of decision-making in the WTO and the role of NGOs. With the
exception of substantive contributions related to compliance with the dispute
settlement system (see, e.g., Hudec, 1993; BuÈtler and Hauser, 2000; Busch and
Reinhardt, 2001; Reinhardt, 2001) and the role of economic strength and power in
litigation (see, e.g., Horn et al., 1999; Guzman and Simmons, 2005) research on
outcome is either largely fragmented or converges around the classical poles of IR
theories (see, e.g., Mearsheimer, 1994; Chayes and Chayes, 1995). The old dichotomy
between those who believe the WTO greatly matters and those who deny any
substantial influence should be questioned. There is need for a better understanding of
how the WTO matters, going beyond the null hypothesis that treaties do not constrain
parties.42 Generally, we need to steer away from a research agenda too narrow on
compliance and ask how efficient and effective the system really is.43 StudiesÐapplying
``most unlikely case design'' (Zangl, 2005; Busch et al., 2005; Allee, 2004)Ðindicate
that even strong actors find themselves increasingly constrained by international norms.
In other words, policy autonomy has decreased through the process of an emerging
international rule of law. These contributions offer useful empirical information but
need to be connected and deepened so as to enable us to understand when constraints
matter and how. The puzzle remains as to what conditions determine the degree of
constraining effects of international trade law. What factors influence the intention and
capacity of actors to comply? (see Brown and Jacobson, 2000).
From a vertical dimension, we need to ask how international institutions affect
State behaviour generally (Martin and Simmons, 1998). How do international norms
and interaction within institutions influence domestic preferences (Claude, 1966;
Finnemore, 1996; Johnston, 2001; Simmons and Elkins, 2004) and compliance
(Franck, 1988; Chayes and Chayes, 1995)? Moreover, what are the conditions that
support and constrain the outside-in effect on legitimate governance domestically
(Pevehouse, 2002; Wolfe, 2003)? In a horizontal dimension, we need to ask how does a
WTOization process affect policies in neighbouring fields; how has WTOization
changed the balance among international governmental organizations and what have
41 The study by Rose (2004), in which he argues that being a GATT/WTO Member does not increase trade-
flows in any statistically significant way, has provoked a fruitful debate.
42 This hypothesis is based on the argument that commitments do not compel actors to abide by rules as they
would have compliedÐin the absence of a treatyÐto these rules anyway (Downs et al., 1996; Martin and
Simmons, 1998); see the debate on whether treaties constrain or screen (Simmons, 2000; von Stein, 2005;
Simmons and Hopkins, 2005).
43 Young and Levy (1999) outline different forms of effectiveness: problem solving, legal, economic,
normative and political. Iida (2004) discusses different areas where the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement
system could be measured, including dispute solving capacities, fending off unilateralism, assuring a level playing
field, taking into account non-trade concerns and balancing legislative and judicial functions.
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been the institutional responses to the overlapping regimes? How does regime outcome
score according to concepts of external accountability (Keohane, 2003)? From a more
dynamic viewpoint, there is demand for an analysis of how WTOization creates
compliance-pull, changes domestic processes and structures, affects the balance of
interest group competition and feeds back into the system. For this, we need a better
understanding of the dynamics of legalization processes. How does increased
legalization (i.e., the aspect of bindingness) affect contracting parties' long-term
interests in the GATT/WTO system? In this light, can the WTO be modelled as an
``efficient breach contract'' (clausula rebus sic stantibus) or is it guided by the obligation to
comply (pacta sunt servanda)? How do these different conceptions and the empirically
observable behaviour affect the stability of the system (Rosendorff, 2005) or the
likelihood of liberalization in the post-trade-negotiation period (Goldstein and Martin,
2000)? How does the process import new legal cultures into the system spilling back to
other national legal systems (Weiler, 2001)?
Finally, we need a better empirically based understanding of how participants'
views of a legitimate organization are constructed and react to exogenous factors? We
need to go beyond single case-studies where some actors felt marginalized in the
process and disapproved the outcome and assess more systematically the overall
satisfaction of the shareholders directly involved in policy-making and of the
stakeholders affected by decisions taken at the international level or at the national
level by powerful parties to the agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that shortcomings related to legitimacy have many facets.
Therefore, the story of WTO reform is not as straightforward as many scholars and
practitioners in the field of trade law and trade policy suggest. The optimal form of the
WTOÐnot starting from scratch but from the perspective of an evolving institution
carrying the weight of 60 years of trade politicsÐis far from obvious. The treatment of
the alleged shortcomings is dependent on the diagnosis, which again is largely
conditioned on philosophical conceptions described in this article. Moreover,
treatment is a tricky task, as it needs to control for the many dynamic effects flowing
from changing aspects of input or output-related functions of the GATT/WTO system.
In addition, in the past we might have overemphasized the study on the effects of
legalization to the detriment of focusing on the challenges posed by the distributional
effects of cooperation or as Martin and Simmons put it, ``unless the problem of
equilibrium selection is resolved, all the third-party monitoring in the world will not
allow for stable international cooperation'' (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 745).
In the short term, we should neither be carried away by aspirations of
``cosmopolitanism'' (Held, 2004a)Ðwithout giving it up as a possible long-term
visionÐnor give in to the sirens' calls to accompany reform discussion with a cynical
attitude. As no ``constitutional moment'' seems to be in sight, the focus should be on
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pragmatic steps. Engaged discussions on the redesign of ``embedded'' liberalism as the
driving philosophical rationale for multilateral economic governance (see ZuÈrn, 2004)
are a manifestation of a growing world demos that actively engages in deliberation,
communicative action, pluralist competition and contestation. These are positive signs
in light of an often-perceived increased passiveness of the citizens of the world.
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